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Defendant and
Respondent.
BRIEF OF RESPONDEAT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The issues are procedural.

The questions are whether

a divorce decree is final as to child support orders in the
sense that the action is no longer pending and whether it is
appropriate to take a deposition in aii attempt to recover
child support arrearages without first filing a pleading.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOW^R COURT
Judge Bryant H. Croft on June 4, 197 6, decreed as
follows:
1.

The signing of a divorce decree closes the action

and specific relief must be plead in brder for there to be
a justici±>le issue upon which further discovery may be predicated.
2.

The Utah Department of |Social Services may be

joined as a real party in interest ir^ a divorce case where

it has provided support, received an assignment, made proper
application and given proper notice.
sustained by the
Services

This ruling was later

Utah Supreme Court in the case of Social

v. Margo Bartholomew, March 76.
3.

No seperate action need be filed by the

Department of Social Services as its petition to intervene
is based upon a support order in the divorce decree.
4.

The attorney is deemed relieved of fur-

ther representation upon the filing of the divorce decree,
and service may not be had on defendant by mailing a copy
of the notice of taking deposition to the attorney six years
after the case was closed.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks to have provisions #1 and
#4 upheld and to have an order entered requiring the State
Department of Social Services to file a pleading before it
takes depositions in support arrearage cases.
STATEMENTS OF FACTS
Defendant Thomas Mattingly was formerly married
to Kathryn Mattingly.

Two children were born of the marriage.

A final divorce decree was entered May 15, 1970, requiring
defendant to pay child support of $50 for each child per
month.
The Utah State Department of Social Services,
represented by the attorney general's office, about January
27, 1976, filed an ex parte motion and became a party to the

case, pursuant to statute.

The motion was accompanied by an

affidavit signed by the assistant attorney general, Stephen
Schwendiman, v/ho claimed no personal knowledge of statements
in the affidavit.
A copy of the ex parte motion to join and the order
of joinder, along with a notice of taking defendants deposition, were mailed January 27, 1976, to Attorney Don Bybee, vhad represented the defendant in the original proceeding,
and to Attorney Ray Grossman, who had represented the plaintiff in the original proceedings.
On January 30, 1976, Mr. Grossman filed notice that
he did not represent or know the whereabouts of either
Kathryn L. Mattingly or Thomas C. Mattingly.
On February 3, 1976/ Mr. Bybee filed objection to
the interpleader and taking of deposition alleging:
1.

The divorce action is closed.

2.

The Utah Department of Social Services is not

a real party in interest.
3.

A

separate action should be filed before a

deposition can be taken.
4.

One cannot serve a defendant by mailing to his

former attorney after a case in concluded.
These objections were heard by Judge Bryant Croft
on June 4, 1976.
Points 1 and 4.

He ruled in favor of Attorney Bybee on
The overruling of objection Two (2)

challenged here.
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is not

POINT I
THE SIGNING OF A DIVORCE DECREE IN UTAH IS
FINAL AS TO PAST DUE SUPPORT PAYMENTS AND, UNTIL OR UNLESS
MODIFIED, AS TO FUTURE SUPPORT PAYMENTS.
Under UCA

30-3-5, the court retains contin-

uing jurisdiction to deal with custody and support matters
and may make such modifications and alterations as the court
deems equitable and necessary.
However, the court on numerous occassions has
recognized the finality of past due support payments.

See

Openshaw v. Openshaw, 144 P2d 528; Myers v. Myers, 62 U 90,
218 P 123, 30 ALR 74; Cole v. Cole, 101 U 355, 122 P2d 201;
Larsen v. Larsen, 9 U2d 160, 340 P2d 421; Openshaw v. Openshaw,
102 U 22, 126 P2d 1068.
Harmon v. Harmon, 491 P2d 231, 26 U2d 436,
admittedly recognizes the continuing jurisdiction of the court
to deal with support matters and the different character of
support orders as claimed by appellant in his brief.

But

the case did not address the question of whether past due
support payments were final orders; rather the court's disposition of the case recognized the finality of support orders.
In Harmon, the ex-wife had brought suit to recover support
arrearages due under a divorce decree.

The lower court en-

tered judgment for her along with a stay of execution on that
judgment so long as the defendant made regular future payments
along with some partial payment on the arrearage.
tiff's ex-wife objected to that stay.

-4-

The plain-

It was in upholding

that stay that the Supreme Court spoke of the different character of support orders and in so doing was recognizing the
finality of past due payments

(orders).

We submit that the other four cases appellant
relies on to support his position that a decree is not final
as to the support rights of children also fail to address the
question.
Rees v. Archibald, 6 U2d 864, 311 P2d 788, stands
for the proposition that a father's responsibility for his
child's support is not affected by a divorce decree that
does not award support payments.
Bott v. Bott, 20 U2d 329, 437 P2d 684, was a contempt proceeding in which the court held that it retained
jurisdiction to modify a divorce decree regarding the distribution of property, a position that is neither attacked
by appellee nor supportive of appellant's position.
In Harrison v. Harrison, 22 U2d 180, 450 P2d 456,
the question was whether particular modifications made by the
lower court were proper.

Although the question of the fi-

nality of a divorce decree was not addressed, such a position
is not inconsistent with the holding of the case.
In Riding v. Riding, 329 P2d 878, 3 U2d 136, the
Supreme Court held that a former wife, by stipulation, could
not relieve her former husband of child support obligations
imposed by a divorce decree.
In none of these cases was the Supreme Court asked
to answer the question of whether a divorce decree is final

-5-

as to the support rights of children-

Each of the cases,

including those recognizing the continuing jurisdiction of
the court to modify a decree, is consistent with the position
that a divorce decree is final as to support rights.
POINT II
THE ISSUANCE OF A SUBPEONA TO COMPEL ATTENDANCE FOR DEPOSITION PRECEEDINGS WITHOUT FIRST FILING A PLEADING ALLEGING AN ARREARAGE IN SUPPORT PAYMENTS AND ASKING FOR
JUDGMENT, EXECUTION, OR CONTEMPT IS NOT APPROPRIATE.
"Rule 26 (b) (1) In general. Parties may
obtain discovery regarding any matter,
not privileged, which is relevant to the
subject matter involved in the pending
action . . . " [Emphasis added]
"Rule 30 (a) When Deposition may be taken.
After commencement of the action, any
party may take the testimony of any person . . . Leave of court . . . must be
obtained only if the plaintiff seeks to
take a deposition prior to the expiration
of thirty days after service . . . "
[Emphasis added]
Thus it is clear that the Supreme Court intended that an action be commenced or be pending in order for
deposition proceedings to be properly held.

To argue that

the commencement of the original divorce proceedings satisfies
this requirement completely ignores the finality aspect of
a divorce decree.

(See Point I regarding finality.)

A case should no longer be considered pending
once a final decree has been entered and the case closed.
See UCA, 30-3-7.
"When decree becomes absolute. The decree
of divorce shall become absolute at the
expiration of three months from the entry
thereof . . . "
-6-

It is therefore apparent that tihree months after
entry of a divorce decree, such decree i$ final, the case
is closed, and the action is not longer pending.
The fact that the decree is final does not preclude
the re-opening of the case to modify or alter some provision
of the decree.

This possibility, however, does not change

the final character of the divorce decree.

Again see Point

I.
In order, then, for a deposition to be taken, the
inquiring party must take some step to once again cause the
action to be commenced or considered pending.

This is typ-

ically done by issuing an order to show cause, by the institution of contempt proceedings, or by asking for a writ of
execution under URCP 69.
That this is the practice in 0tah is evident by
the numerous Utah cases which exemplify the procedure to
be followed when enforcement of a divorce decree is sought.
See McKay v. McKay, 370 P2d 358, 13 U2d 187, where the plaintiff sought to collect past due support money awarded for a
minor child by bringing an order to shdw cause proceeding
seeking to have her former husband held in contempt; Hall
v. Hall, 326 P2d 707, 7 U2d 413, where an action was brought
to reduce unpaid support money to judgment; Larsen v. Larsen,
300 P2 596, 5 U2d 224, a suit against a former husband for
past due child support payments awarded by a divorce decree;
Harris v. Harris, 377 P2d 1007, 14 U2d 96, a proceeding by
a divorced wife to have her divorced husband found in contempt
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for failure to comply with provisions of the divorce decree
and to recover delinquent support money.
See also Brown v. Brown, 228 P2d 816, where the
contempt procedure was followed; T?allis v. T-?allis, 342 P2d
103, 9 U2d 2 37, a proceeding to hold plaintiff's former husband in contempt and for judgment for all arrearages in
support since the entry of the divorce decree; Pluckard v.
Anderson, 333 P2d 1065, 8 U2d 299, which involved supplemental proceedings for unpaid support money.
See further Smith v. Bray, 357 P2d 189, 11 U2d
218, an action by a divorced wife against her former husband
to obtain delinquent support payments for a minor child;
Atkinson v. Strong, 490 P2d 729, 26 U2d 405, where a former
wife sought judgment for past due support payments and to
have her former husband punished for contempt.
In all of these cases, action was taken to again
bring the defendant before the court before the question of
past due support payments was explored.
In Shaffield v. Shaffield, 34 So2d 591, the plaintiff filed a bill to cancel a deed for her former husband's
land to his new wife so that said land could be used to pay
back alimony and support.

In that same bill, plaintiff also

asked for discovery, alleging that such "discovery is necessary to enable complainant to reach and subject the same
to the satisfaction of said amount due and to become under
the decree."

Here again it was recognized that automatic

discovery is not appropriate when a final decree has closed
a divorce case.
-8-

Installments of support allowances when due and unpaid become final judgments and maybe collected in the same
manner as other judgments.

Schaffer v. District Court In and

For the City and County of Denver, 470 P2d 18, 172 Colo 43;
Sproston v. Sproston, 505 P2d 479, 3 Wash App. 218; Beiter
v. Beiter, 265 NE2d 324, 24 Ohio App. 149.
Proceedings to enforce an order for the payment of
money for the support of minor children are subject to any
valid defense against the required payment.

Armstrong v.

Green, 260 Ala 39, 68 So2d 834; Lear v. Lear, 189 P2d 237,
29 Wash 2d 692.
Shaw v. Pilcher, 341 P2d 949, 9 U2d 222, and
McGavin v. McGavin, 494 P2d 283, 27 U2d 200, recognized
the propriety of defending against child support orders.
And in Boyle

v. Baggs, 350 P2d 622, 10 U2d

203, the court said, "Even though the decree recites the
monthly payments to be made, a number of situations may
exist where there would be no debt

under the decree and

which facts would not be shown by an examination of the
record . . . As between the parties such circumstances could
be shown in any determination of the amount due under the
decree."
Without the partyj wishing to take a deposition
taking some step that would cause a diyorce action to be
re-opened or re-commenced so that it is once again pending,
the defendant party to be deposed would have no opportunity to defend in court.
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Appellant relies on Scheffer v. Scheffer, 48 NYS2d
839, 183 Misc. 344, to show the propriety of allowing the
use of depositions for determining the financial status of
the husband after a decree of divorce has been entered.

T<

Ie

do not dispute the propriety of using depositions for such
purposes.

We argue that if a deposition is to be taken, it

can be taken only after a pleading has caused the case to
again be pending.

In Scheffer this requirement had been met

as the wife was bringing a contempt action against her former husband for failure to pay alimony.
We agree with appellant when he says " . . . there
must be some tool available to parties to establish what the
situation is relative to child support payments."
(Appellant's brief p.8. ) we contend, however, that proper
procedure must be used when such tools are brought into play.
Appellant speaks of inexpensive methods and the
conservation of tax dollars as reasons to shortcut the proper
procedures.

We submit that such are not sufficient reasons

to shortcut and circumvent clear rules, case laws, and due
process rights.
POINT III
THE DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO KNOW WHAT FACTS ARE
RELEVANT TO A DEPOSITION AND IS DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS IF
HE IS COMPELLED TO SUBMIT TO A FISHING EXPEDITION BY THE
OPPOSITION BEFORE THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE ACTION BY A
PLEADING.
Utah Code 30-3-5 provides that a divorce court retains jurisdiction to deal with custody and child support
-10-

matters; that proposition is not attacked nor is it relevant
to this appeal.

What is at issue is the manner in which such

matters are commenced.

The Utah Code 30-3-1 provides:

"Proceedings in divorce shall be commenced and
conducted in the manner providted by law for
proceedings in civil cases. . ."
Civil cases are to be commenced under URCP 3 by
" (1) by filing a complaint with the court. . . (c) The court
shall have jurisdiction from the time of filing the complaint
or the service of the summons."
It is aximomatic that civil c^ses are to be conducted consistently with the tenants of due process.
Merely notifying a defendant that his deposition
is to be taken in connection with a divorce case in which a
final decree has been entered does not give the defendant
notice as to what the subject matter of the inquiry may be.
Due process requires that some sort of pleading —

order to

show cause, citation, order to enforce judgment, writ of
execution— be filed to delineate the issues.
Support money judgments are based on defaults occurring after entry of the divorce decree from which they are
derived and a former husband as allegecf judgment debtor in
such proceedings is entitled to due process of law, so as to
know the claimed facts and can controvert them in court if
he elects.

Ditmar v. Ditmar, 293 P2d 759, 48 Wash 2d 373.

Pleadings are to frame and present the issues to
be tried, vis; state, define, and limit the issues that are
presented for determination at the tri^l.
229, 99P 1003.

Tate v. Rose 35 U

Toone v. J.O. O'Neill Const. Co. 40U 265, 121 P 1
-11-

The due process requirement is again emphasized in
URCP 7, which provides in part:
"(1) Motions. An application to the Court for
an order shall be by motion which, unless made
during a hearing or trial, shall be made in writing, shall state with particularity the grounds
therefore, and shall set forth the relief or
order sought . . . " (Emphasis added)
One of the inherent equity powers of the court is
the enforcement of support orders.

These actions are taken

by citation, order to show cause, or by contempt proceedings.
Uerzog v. Bramel, 82 U 216, 23 P2d 345.
To secure any of these actions, the moving party
must allege and prove the alleged conditions.
Chaffee, 63 U. 261, 225 P. 76.
261, 236 P. 457.

Chaffee v.

Rockwood v. Rockwood, 65 U

Hampton v. Hampton, 86 U. 570, 47 P2d 419.

Hodification of a decree is obtained by the filing
of a petition and the petition must set forth facts alleging
a change of conditions or be dismissed.
U. 275, 139 P2d 222.
new matter

Jones v. Jones, 104

These allegations must set forth the

or facts in a verified petition or affidavit in

a formal manner and it should be stated therein, in clear
and concise terms, just what the applicant complains of and
what he desires to prove.

Cody v. Cody, 47 U. 456, 154 P.

952, distinguished in 58 U. 228, 198 P. 165.
It is clear from the record that no petition, complaint, order to show cause, contempt citation, or action
to enforce judgment, either verified or unverified, formal
or informal, has been filed.
Appellant's ex parte motion for order for joinder
-12-

of parties is not such a pleading since it fails to comply
with the due process notice of requirements of a pleading.
Furthermore, Utah Code Annotated 78-45-9 also
recognizes the necessity of an action being commenced when
it gives the Attorney General's office responsibility of
representing the State Department of Social Services "whenever any court action is commenced" by that department.

A

motion for joinder may give the Department the right to
commence an action, but that motion alone commences nothing.
POINT IV
AN ATTORNEY IS DEEMED RELIEVED OF FURTHER REPRESENTATION OF A CLIENT UPON THE ENTRY OF A FINAL DECREE
AND SERVICE ON DEFENDANT MAY NOT BE HAD BY MAILING NOTICE
TO THE FORMER ATTORNEY.
An attorney is hired to bring an action to judgment only and is deemed relieved of further representation
upon the entry of a final decree in the case.

Sandall v.

Sandall, 57 U 150, 193 P. 1093, 15 ALR 620.
This principal was followed in Schuler v. Dickson,
243 P 377, which, quoting from Sandall, said, "It is always
a presumption that an attorney is employed to conduct the
litigation to judgment and no further; the relation of attorney and client and the general powers of the attorney cease
upon the rendition and entry of the judgment."
It follows, then, that since the authority of the
attorney for defendant in a divorce proceeding terminates
upon entry of the final divorce decree, subsequent notice to
that attorney is without effect upon the defendant.
-13-

In the Sandall case, supra, a divorce decree had
been rendered in favor of plaintiff who several years later
moved to have the decree modified, serving notice of said
motion upon the attorney who had represented the defendant
in the original divorce action.

The Supreme Court held that

service should not have been made upon defendant's former
attorney and that such service alone was not sufficient to
give the court jurisdiction over the defendant.
Attorney Bybee here represented the defendant in
the above-entitled case in the original divorce action in
197 0 but has not subsequently been employed or retained by
his former client in connection with the divorce.

The ap-

pearance of Attorney Bybee has been a special appearance
only to contest service and the attempt on the part of the
State Attorney General's office to shortcut procedural due
process.

The attorney has not been paid for the special

appearance nor this appeal and was brought into the case
by the Attorney General and placed in a position where he
had to respond at great expense or see a former client be
denied due process, and it is reasonable that the State be
required to pay costs and a reasonable fee of $1,000.00.
CONCLUSION
The welfare recovery division performs an Executive
service in stimulating the payment of support.

This area

was formerly handled by private persons through private
counsel.

The division is continually expanding government

into the private sector on the basis of recouping welfare,
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which was the original grant of authority.

They now try pa-

ternity cases, determine fraud and eligibility for relief,
hear and set amounts of support, handle estates, execute liens,
and a myriad of judicial functions beyond the scope of legislative authorization.

As a part of this expansion, the

recovery bureau determined an interview with the allegedly
defaulting obligor would produce the bedt results if conducted
with the formality of a deposition.

Thd deposition is then

used to support criminal action, induce repayment agreements,
seize property, or determine deficienci^ncies from support.
Without affirmative pleadings, the deponent cannot
limit the scope of the examination nor even be present if his
former attorney is the only one served, and he is, thus, denied
due process of law.

M s o , the judicial retirement fund is

dependent upon filing fees, and the state pays none by using
closed pleadings to initiate action.

Further, the attorney

is placed in an untenable position in having to defend without
a client or payment for his time or in Jfacing disciplinary
proceedings for ignoring the notice of [deposition.
The Court should find this adtion not commenced and
quash the taking of Defendant's deposition.

They should also

rule that a divorce is final and the attorney discharged upon the filing of the decree and award $1,000.00 costs and
attorney's fees to Don L. Bybee.
Respectfully submitted,
DON L. BYBEE
Attbrney at Law
Nanp. Novinski-Durando
Associate
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